Update March 2016: Judge Richard Franklin Boulware II
now presides over all cases since Judge James C. Mahan recused in February 2916!
Richard Franklin Boulware II (born 1968) is a United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada and former assistant Federal Public Defender.
Boulware received an Artium Baccalaureus degree, cum laude, in 1993 from Harvard College and studied toward a PhD in Sociology from 1995–1998. He received a Juris Doctor in 2002 from Columbia Law School. From 2002 to 2003, he served as a law clerk to Judge Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
From 2003 to 2007, he was a trial attorney in the Federal Public Defender’s Office in New York. He has served in the Federal Public Defender’s Office in Las Vegas,Nevada since 2007, serving as the lead attorney for complex white-collar cases since 2010.
On January 16, 2014, President Obama nominated Boulware to serve as a United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, to the seat vacated by Judge Philip Martin Pro, who took senior status on December 31, 2011.
He received a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 12, 2014.
On April 3, 2014 his nomination was reported out of committee by a vote of 11-7. On June 5, 2014 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid filed for cloture on the nomination. On Monday, June 9, 2014 The United States Senate agreed on the motion to invoke cloture by a vote of 53-34. On Tuesday, June 10, 2014 The U.S. Senate voted 58-35 in favor of final confirmation. He received his judicial commission on June 10, 2014. He was sworn in on June 12, 2014.
On September 9, 2015 President Barack Obama nominated Boulware to a position on the United States Sentencing Commission. If confirmed he would replace former Commissioner Ketanji Brown Jackson and his term would expire October 31, 2019. His nomination is now pending before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
Judge Richard F. Boulware
The letter comes pursuant to LR 7-6 and 7-5. Case number 3:13-cv-00438-RFB-VPC is now assigned to Judge Richard F. Boulware and has various motions that have been pending over 60 and 120 days including a motion for summary judgment, motion for PACER fee waiver and several ex parte 7-5 motions to void/vacate all orders issued by the former judge Miranda Du and Magistrate Valerie Cooke.
As I’ve stated in the previous emails, I may file a petition for writ-of-mandate in the 9th circuit court of appeals if my cases continue to remain in limbo. As you know, the entire Northern District of the Federal Court has recused from all three cases and I did suggest to the Chief Judge Gloria Navarro that the entire Nevada Federal Court should be recused and the cases assigned to the 9th circuit for the appointment of an out-of-state judge on all 3 cases. This did not happen and instead Navarro reassigned the cases to Judge Richard F. Boulware and Judge James C. Mahan.
There is urgency since these cases need the fee waivers granted for PACER along with allowing the Plaintiff (me) the ability to file on-line with PACER. I’ve also requested filing fee wavers for both 3:15-cv-00529-RFB-VPC and 3:15-cv-00530-JCM-VPC need to be “filed” so the statute-of-limitations does not become an issue.
Case 3:13-cv-00438-RFB-VPC has been sitting around over 1 1/2/ years on a summary judgment motion. I’ve argued that summary judgment is unconstitutional pursuant to the 7th Amendment in addition to opposing the motion. This motion is ripe and past the 120 day waiting for a decision. Additionally, the motion will exceed 6 months and need to be filed Every six months (October 1 and April 1) every judge must submit a report to Washington that becomes publicly available. Among other things, the judge must report on whether any motion has been under submission more than six months.
I’ve started to write a petition for writ of mandamus to the 9th circuit. Here is some law in addition to the judicial code-of-conduct (canons) that a judge has a duty to decide a case.
A Writ of Mandamus is Necessary to Compel the Court of Appeals to Decide the Emergency Motion for a Stay of Proceedings “Repeated decisions of this court have established the rule that this court has power to issue a mandamus, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and that the writ will lie in a proper case to direct a subordinate Federal court to decide a pending cause.” Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258, 270 (1872). Where a lower court’s failure to act obstructs litigants from having their claims adjudicated and ultimately brought before a higher court, this Court and the courts of appeals have consistently issued writs of mandamus so that the legal process can proceed. In Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 190 (1831), this Court issued a writ of mandamus to compel a lower court to render its judgment, because failing to do so prevented the petitioner from pursuing an appeal.
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, held that “We cannot perceive a reason why the single case of a refusal by an inferior court to sign a bill of exceptions, and thus to place the law of the case on the record, should be withdrawn from that general power to issue writs of mandamus to inferior courts, which is conferred by statute.” Id. at 194; see also Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932) (writ issued to district judge instructing him to issue a bench warrant); Ex parte Bradstreet, 32 U.S. 634 (1833); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323 (1879) (extraordinary writs have “very much extended in modern times, and now it may be said to be an established remedy to oblige inferior courts and magistrates to do that justice which they are in duty, and by virtue of their office, bound to do.”). Likewise in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), this Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s issuance of the writ of mandamus to a district judge, who deferred the adjudication of the petitioner’s federal claims during the pendency of a state court action. This Court held that “There can be no doubt that, where a district court persistently and without reason refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it, the court of appeals may issue the writ ‘in order that [it] may exercise the jurisdiction of review given by law.’”
Id. at 661-62 (quoting Knickerbocker, 16 Wall. at 270). To hold otherwise, the Court has explained, would be to give the lower court a pocket-veto over the higher court’s supervisory jurisdiction and result in an indefinite obstruction of the appellate process. See Roche, 319 U.S. at 25 (“Otherwise the appellate jurisdiction could be defeated and the purpose of the statute authorizing the writ thwarted by unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the appeal”). Following this Court’s direction, the courts of appeal have issued writs of mandamus when the failure of a district court judge to rule on a dispositive motion prejudices the litigants’ ability to seek a timely appeal.5 In McClellan v. Young, 421 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1970), for example, a district court had allowed four months to elapse before ruling on a prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus. Citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), the Sixth Circuit issued the writ and ordered the district judge to render his decision within ten days of the mandate being issued. Id. at 691; see also In re Sharon Steel Corp., 918 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1990) (writ issued to a district judge who declined to rule on a dispositive motion, where “the district court’s inaction [was] an unexplained abdication of judicial power” because the district judge “had a duty to dispose of that motion, a duty inherent in a judicial system which guarantees a conditional right to an appeal.”). Petitioner concedes that “[m]andamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic and extraordinary remedies.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. at 259. Nevertheless, this Court’s issuance of the writ has become necessary to preserve its own appellate jurisdiction. In the circumstances presented here, “appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy,” id. at 260, insofar as it is the appeal itself that is obstructed by the Court of Appeals’ failure to rule.